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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Summary of The Dispute.
In 2007 Burns Holdings, LLC (jointly with its affiliate Burns Concrete, Inc., “Burns”)

entered into an agreement with Teton County, Idaho (“Teton County”) providing for Burns’
construction of (i) substantial road and other public improvements and (ii) a building for a
concrete batch plant having the elevations depicted in an exhibit to the parties’ agreement, which
specified a 75-foot height for the building.

But shortly after Teton County executed and

recorded the agreement and Burns constructed the public improvements and other work it was
contractually obligated to immediately construct, Teton County denied Burns the conditional use
permit required by the relevant zoning ordinance for the building.
Because the agreement between Burns and Teton County required Burns to install and
then operate a temporary concrete batch plant until the 75-foot building could be constructed,
Burns installed and continued to operate its temporary plant while it sought to obtain the required
zoning approvals and building permit. However, because (i) Teton County refused to issue
Burns a conditional use permit to construct a 75-foot building, (ii) the Idaho Supreme Court
subsequently ruled that Burns was required to obtain a zoning variance rather than a conditional
use permit for the building, and (iii) Teton County then also refused to issue Burns a zoning
variance to construct the building, Burns was left with no alternative but to operate its temporary
batch plant until Teton County might amend its zoning ordinances to allow for Burns’
construction of its desired 75-foot building.
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Notwithstanding Teton County having induced Burns into buying the property and
equipment required for a concrete batch plant, installing and operating a temporary and less
efficient batch plant pending construction of the building depicted in the parties’ agreement, and
constructing extensive public and other improvements to satisfy Burns’ contractual obligations,
Teton County shut down Burns’ operation of its temporary batch plant and attempted to rezone
Burns’ property so that it could no longer be used in accordance with the terms of the agreement.
Burns then filed this lawsuit to enforce the terms of the agreement and recover either (i) Burns’
actual damages for Teton County’s repudiation and breach of the agreement, or (ii) should the
agreement be held to be unenforceable for any reason (which it was not), restitution damages for
the benefits Burns provided Teton County under the agreement.
This is the second appeal in this case. In the first appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court
reversed the district court’s holding that the force majeure clause in the parties’ agreement did
not apply, vacated the judgment entered for Teton County dismissing Burns’ complaint and all of
Burns’ claims, and remanded the case for trial.
On remand, the district court granted Burns summary judgment on the liability element of
its claim for breach of contract and, following a bench trial, entered judgment in Burns’ favor (i)
decreeing that the force majeure clause in the parties’ agreement be given effect in accordance
with the Supreme Court’s opinion in the first appeal, and (ii) awarding Burns over $1 million in
damages.
Following Teton County’s appeal to this Court of the judgment entered by the district
court, Burns filed a cross-appeal and has filed the Cross-Appellants’ Brief concurrently herewith.
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B.

Summary of The Proceedings.
Burns does not dispute the Course of Proceedings stated by Teton County at pages 2-3 in

Appellant’s Brief, but augments the description of the proceedings stated by both (i)
incorporating herein by reference the Course of the Proceedings included at pages 3-5 in CrossAppellants’ Brief, and (ii) clarifying that the final judgment appealed by Burns in the prior
appeal in this case dismissed Burns’ complaint and all of Burns’ claims [Clerk’s Record, filed
June 6, 2019 (“R”), p. 60].
C.

Statement of The Facts.
In addition to disputing and clarifying below select statements made at pages 3-10 in

Appellant’s Brief, Burns augments Teton County’s Statement of Facts by incorporating herein
by reference the Statement of the Facts included at pages 5-27 in Cross-Appellants’ Brief
(hereinafter “SOF”).
(i)

Cessation of Plant Operations.

Teton County asserts at page 7, paragraph 21, of Appellant’s Brief that Burns did not
cease operations of the temporary plant in response to Teton County’s 2012 demand letters. This
is correct but misleading and requires clarification.
The district court’s findings regarding Burns’ cessation of plant operations are as follows:
The fact that Teton County had not yet breached the
contract when Burns Concrete incurred many of its expenses in
reliance on the Agreement is immaterial to the determination of
reliance damages. Teton County had created a sufficiently hostile
environment as to cause, at least in part, Plaintiffs’ decision to
cease operations in Driggs. Subsequently, Plaintiffs continued to
seek a variance to construct the permanent facility. After Plaintiffs
were denied the variance, Teton County sent Plaintiffs letters
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revoking Plaintiffs’ ability to operate the temporary facility and
demanding the temporary facility’s removal. Teton County’s
actions breached the Agreement. Both the County’s actions prior
to cessation of operations in 2010 and in breach of the Agreement
prevented Plaintiffs from operating under the terms of the
Agreement.
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Amended and Additional Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, filed January 18, 2019 (“Supplemental Findings & Conclusions”), at 10-11
[R, pp. 246-47]. See also Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, filed October 4, 2018
(“Findings & Conclusions”), at 8 (“Burns Concrete’s decision to cease operations in 2010 was
based, at least in part, on the existence of an unfavorable environment in Teton County, created
by actions of the Teton County Board of Commissioners.”) [R, p. 213].
The district court’s foregoing findings are supported by substantial and uncontested
evidence in the record. See SOF ¶¶ 55-56.
(ii)

Assignment of Claims.

Teton County asserts at page 8, paragraph 24, of Appellant’s Brief that it was not the
intent for Burns Holdings to transfer all of its claims against Teton County to Burns Concrete.
This assertion is also correct but misleading and requires clarification.
The district court ruled on the applicable question as follows:
[S]ince 2013, both Burns Holdings and Burns Concrete have an
equal interest in the real property. Both Plaintiffs have assigned to
each other an undivided interest [in] their respective claims in this
action.
Findings & Conclusions 10 [R, p. 215].
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The district court’s foregoing ruling is supported by substantial and uncontested evidence
in the record. See SOF ¶¶ 51-53; Exhibit 4 [Trial Exhibits, filed June 6, 2019 (“Ex”),
pp. 104-06]; and Exhibit 5 [Ex, pp. 438-40].
(iii)

Support for Claimed Damages.

Teton County asserts at page 9, paragraph 27, of Appellant’s Brief that the damages
claimed by Burns were not generated from accounting software and were not standard financial
reports. This too is correct but misleading and requires clarification.
The district court’s findings on the applicable question are as follows:
As illustrated in Exhibit 8, Burns Concrete’s financial
records show net expenditures of $1,905,344.78 from December
2006 through the date of trial. Allen Barger, Burns Concrete’s
controller, created Exhibit 8. In order to create Exhibit 8, Barger
sifted through thousands of invoices, payments and other financial
documents. Often, only a portion of any given invoice or payment
was attributable to the Driggs facility, as opposed to other Burns
Concrete sites. Barger’s efforts to compile Exhibit 8 required him
to work with both Kirk Burns and Burns Concrete’s attorney and
took one year to complete.
This Court accepts the majority of those expenses shown
on Exhibit 8 as legitimately incurred in reliance on the Agreement.
Findings & Conclusions 8 [R, p. 213].
The district court’s foregoing finding is supported by substantial and uncontested
evidence in the record. See SOF ¶¶ 33-38 and Exhibit 8 [Ex, pp. 2-102].
(iv)

Support for Demobilization Costs.

Teton County asserts at page 9, paragraph 32, of Appellant’s Brief that the estimated
demolition costs to restore the subject property to a marketable condition are speculative costs
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that have not yet been incurred.

Although Teton County is correct in stating that the

demobilization costs in question have yet to be incurred, the amount of these costs was supported
by competent expert testimony.
The district court’s finding on the applicable question is as follows:
Burns Concrete’s estimate of costs related
demobilization, as included in Exhibit 8, are reasonable.

to

Findings & Conclusions 9 [R, p. 214].
The district court’s foregoing finding is supported by substantial and uncontested
evidence in the record. See SOF ¶¶ 25, 37, 44, 59(b) & 62 and Ex. 9 [Ex, p. 1].
(v)

Loss Caused by Breach of Agreement.

Finally, Teton County asserts at page 10, paragraph 34, of Appellant’s Brief that Burns
would not have generated any profits if the parties’ agreement (the “Agreement”) [Ex, pp. 20011] had not been breached by Teton County. Teton County’s contention was litigated at trial and
decided to the contrary.
The district court’s findings on whether Burns would have realized profits if Teton
County had not breached the Agreement are as follows:


If Burns Concrete had been able to continue operating the
temporary facility it would have made incremental profits
every year from 2010 on. Burns Concrete’s revenues would
have permitted it to recover its costs over time, pay off all of its
debt and produced a net income by 2017.

Findings & Conclusions 8 [R, p. 213].


Teton County did not establish Plaintiffs would have suffered
losses entitling them to an additional offset.
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Id. at 16 [R, p. 221].


While Plaintiffs suffered a loss during the temporary facility’s
operation, it was projected, even by Teton County’s expert, to
make a net profit by 2017.

Supplemental Findings & Conclusions 9 [R, p. 245].


If the Agreement had been fully performed, Plaintiffs would
have paid off its expenses (including those encompassed by the
reliance damages) and debt and produced a net profit by 2017.
Teton County did not establish that Plaintiffs would have
suffered a net loss even if it had been allowed to continue in
operation. Teton County failed to prove losses sufficient to
offset Plaintiffs’ reliance damages.

Id.
The district court’s foregoing findings are supported by substantial evidence in the
record. Thus, the president and CEO of Burns Concrete, Kirk Burns, confirmed that Burns
Concrete would have continued to operate the temporary facility had Teton County allowed it to
do so because all the costs of the facility had been paid for already and Burns Concrete’s
operations would yield a 30% to 40% gross margin, which would have allowed Burns Concrete
to recover all of the costs included in Exhibit 8 over time and then generate a profit. [Trial
Transcript, filed June 6, 2019 (“Tr”), p. 269, L. 13 – p. 273, L. 3.]
Further, Burns Concrete’s rebuttal expert, Bruce L. Ross, calculated the incremental
profit rate and cash flow for the temporary facility starting with the information contained in the
report of Teton County’s expert, Richard S. Hoffman, and explained each adjustment that should
be made to Mr. Hoffman’s report. [Tr, p. 718, L. 18 – p. 720, L. 18.] Mr. Ross then summarized
his expert opinions as follows:
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Q.
So looking at this Slide 20, then, what is that telling you
with respect to every dollar of concrete sales that would be made
down at the Driggs facility? What is the impact, then, on
incremental profits?
A.
The impact is that Mr. Burns and – and I think Mr.
Hoffman used these words – would be putting [sic] 45 cents for
every dollar of concrete he could sell.
So for – for every yard of concrete he put out there,
he’d be earning a 45 percent profit rate or cash flow rate.
Q.
So for every dollar he collected, he put 45 percent – 45
cents in profits into his pocket, right?
A.

Right.

Q.

Does that give him the incentive to sell concrete?

A.
Absolutely. He’s already paid all the money to – to – to
make the facility operate. All of that is debt. He had – he
wouldn’t [sic] have a profit overall at – at some point.
But every time he sold a yard, he’d be earning
money. So he’d want to sell more and more yards. He’d want to
sell as many yards as he could.
Q.
And that’s because he’d already paid for all the plant and
all of the equipment and all of the fixed costs associated with
running it?
A.

Correct.

Q.
And all of the plant and all of the equipment and all of the
fixed costs for running it are still out there [or] at the site over in
Idaho Falls, ready to be used, to your knowledge, right?
A.
Based on what I’ve been informed about and based on my
own physical observation.
Q.
And is – are those the so-called sunk costs that we’ve
talked about?
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A.

They are.

Q.

They don’t relate to incremental profits, do they?

A.
They do not.
profits.

Sunk costs do not relate to incremental
***

Q.
Is he [Hoffman] also assuming that the – ultimately, that
the – that the temporary facility is not out there when it is out
there; that it’s not operational when it is operational?
That it could not earn a profit or generate a return to
Burns when it, in fact, would have if it had been allowed to
operate; all those things?
A.
Yeah. I mean, as I said before, he’s really calculating a
return to shareholders.
And he may be right on that point in the sense that
the shareholders might not have gotten a return at this point
because the temporary facility’s been – you know – you know, had
– it’s been closed. It had its problems. It suffered from – that’s
been described in this case.
But I – you know, it’s pretty clear that, if he can sell
a minimal number of yards, he would earn money on those yards.
And any reasonable businessperson would want him
to operate a facility because he’s already spent all the money. It’s
just sitting out there. He’s not getting anything back for all the
money spent.
And he – according to the numbers that we have in
front of us – and this is where Mr. Hoffman and I agree – that, on
an incremental basis, the Driggs facility, the temporary facility,
would have earned an incremental profit.
Q.
And that was reflected in every single year in Mr.
Hoffman’s report for the temporary facility, that it was generating
an incremental profit – a significant incremental profit if you lay
aside the debt payments, right?
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A.
Yes. Again, your Honor, I’m just looking at Mr.
Hoffman’s Schedule 2.1. And in there, he has a line item that says
“Expected Net Incremental Profit.”
And over the years of – the partial year 2010
through 2017, he shows $488,000 in profit, incremental profit.
Q.

Incremental profit.

A.
And I – I disagree with that number. I think it would be
higher because he put in those extra expenses that shouldn’t be
there. But if you leave out the debt, he’s – he and I are in total
agreement.
Q.
That being that the Driggs facility was generating an
incremental profit for every year of its operation, correct?
A.

And/or predicted operation.

Q.

And projected operations –

A.

Correct.

[Tr, p. 721, L. 20 – p. 723, L. 5 & p. 727, L. 14 – p. 729, L. 6.] See also Exhibit 31 at Schedule
2.1 (a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto) (reflecting, inter alia, Hoffman’s
projections of $488,632 in total net incremental profits through 2017 and of $115,602 in net cash
available for equity holders from 2017 operations, with all debt associated with the temporary
facility having been fully repaid in 2016) [Ex, p. 133]. Moreover, Mr. Hoffman did not project
that Burns would incur any losses or negative cash flow after the debt he attributed to the Driggs
facility was fully repaid in 2016, nor did Hoffman project what profits Burns would have
realized after 2017.
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II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Is Bums entitled to its reasonable attorney fees incurred on appeal pursuant to Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure 54(e)( 1) and Paragraph 12.e of the Agreement?

III.
A.

STANDARDS FOR REVIEW

Preliminary Determinations.
Before considering the merits of questions presented by a second appeal in a case, the

appellate court must first determine whether the "law of the case" doctrine bars consideration of
each question presented. For as explained in PHH Mortgage v. Nickerson, 164 Idaho 33, 423
P.3d 454 (2018):
This Court must first address what issues are properly
before it in this appeal. Idaho adheres to the "law of the case"
doctrine, which provides that when "the Supreme Court, in
deciding a case presented states in its opinion a principle or rule of
law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the
law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent
progress, both in the trial court and upon subsequent appeal." This
"doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of
alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the
earlier appeal."
The doctrine's principles are "best understood as rules of
sensible and sound practice that permit logical progression toward
judgment." "Without something like it, an adverse judicial decision
would become little more than an invitation to take a mulligan,
encouraging lawyers and litigants alike to believe that if at first
you don't succeed, just try again." This would lead to wasted
judicial resources and increased delay in resolving cases, which
would only serve to erode the public's trust in the court system.
The Nickersons' appeal focuses heavily on issues this
Court decided in Nickerson I. Of the seventeen issues they state in
their opening brief, most involve an attempt to re-litigate the prior
determinations of this Court. Because we adhere to the "law of the
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case," this Court will not consider such issues. Accordingly, this
Court will address only those issues that were not decided or could
not have been raised in Nickerson I.

Id. at 38, 423 P.3d at 459 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

B.

Findings Of Fact And Matters Of Law.
As articulated in Huber v. Lighiforce USA, Incorporated, 159 Idaho 833, 367 P.3d 228

(2016): "'When reviewing a trial court's conclusions following a bench trial, our review is
limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the
findings support the conclusions of law."' Id. at 841, 367 P.3d at 236 (quoting Vreeken v.

Lockwood Eng'g, B. V., 148 Idaho 89, 108, 218 P.3d 1150, 1169 (2009)).
The court in Huber went on to summarize the standard for reviewing challenged findings
of fact and conclusions of law as follows:
"Since it is the province of the trial court to weigh conflicting
evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses,
this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in
favor of the judgment entered. These findings of fact will not be
set aside unless the trial court's findings are clearly erroneous. If
the trial court based its findings on substantial evidence, even if the
evidence is conflicting, this Court will not overturn those findings
on appeal. Furthermore, this Court will not substitute its view of
the facts for that of the trial court. However, we exercise free
review over matters of law."

Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Vreeken). Accord Kemmer v. Newman, 161 Idaho 463, 466, 387
P.3d 131, 134 (2016). And as the opinion in Kemmer further explains, "Evidence is regarded as
substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining whether a
disputed point of fact has been proven." Id. (citing Miller v. St. Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc.,
139 Idaho 825, 832, 87 P.3d 934, 941 (2004)). See also Kemmer, 161 Idaho at 467, 387 P.3d at
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135 (“Substantial evidence is ‘relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion.’” (quoting State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273, 276 (2013)).
C.

Summary Judgment.
The opinion in Huber also articulates the standards for reviewing a grant of summary

judgment:
Appeals from an order of summary judgment are reviewed de
novo, and this Court’s standard of review is the same as the
standard used by the trial court in ruling on a motion for summary
judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
I.R.C.P. 56(c). Under this standard, disputed facts are construed in
favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of
material fact, then only a question of law remains, over which this
Court exercises free review.
Huber, 159 Idaho at 841, 367 P.3d at 236 (citation omitted).
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The District Court Did Not Err In Its Award Of Reliance Damages To Burns.
Teton County contests the district Court’s award of reliance damages to Burns on five

stated grounds.

Each of these five grounds is rebutted below in the sequence argued in

Appellant’s Brief.
(i)

Idaho Precedent Establishes That Reliance Damages Are Recoverable by
Burns.

Teton Count requests this Court to adopt a limitation precluding a contracting party
“from pursuing reliance damages when expectation damages are available.” Appellant’s Brief
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12. However, both of Idaho’s appellate courts have previously held that reliance damages are
available at the election of a wronged party when a contract has been breached. Brown v. Yacht
Club of Coeur d’Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 198-99, 722 P.2d 1062, 1065-66 (Ct. App. 1986)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344 (1981) (hereinafter “Restatement § 344”));
Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 9, 936 P.2d 202, 207 (Ct. App.
1997) (citing Brown); and Silverwing at Sandpoint, LLC v. Bonner Cnty., 164 Idaho 786, 797,
435 P.3d 1106, 1117 (2019) (quoting Restatement § 344).
In regard to established precedent such as that just cited, this Court has repeatedly held as
follows:
“When there is controlling precedent on questions of Idaho law the
rule of stare decisis dictates that we follow it, unless it is
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or
unwise, or unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain,
obvious principles of law and remedy continued injustice.” Asbury
Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc., 152
Idaho 338, 343, 271 P.3d 1194, 1199 (2012) (quoting Greenough
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 592, 130
P.3d 1127, 1130 (2006)).
Doe v. Doe, 160 Idaho 854, 859, 380 P.3d 175, 180 (2016). Teton County presents no persuasive
reason why the long-established principles established in the Restatement and Idaho’s two
appellate courts, including the Supreme Court’s opinion earlier this year in Silverwing, should
now be jettisoned.
Furthermore, the uncontroverted testimony at trial was that it was not possible to
reasonably establish the profits the temporary facility would have generated but for Teton
County’s breach. [Tr, p. 282, L. 10 – p. 283, L. 14 & p. 284, LL. 7-15.] Thus, there is no
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evidence in the record supporting the supposition that Bums could reasonably calculate the
amount of its expectation damages.
(ii)

Teton County Failed to Prove That Burns' Reliance Damages Should Be
Capped.

Teton County argues that Bums' reliance damages should be reduced by the amount
Bums would have lost had Teton County not breached the Agreement. Appellants Brief 14.
However, as quoted above, and as substantial evidence in the record supports, the district court
expressly found:
If the Agreement had been fully performed, Plaintiffs would have
paid off its expenses (including those encompassed by the reliance
damages) and debt and produced a net profit by 2017. Teton
County did not establish that Plaintiffs would have suffered a net
loss even if it had been allowed to continue in operation. Teton
County failed to prove losses sufficient to offset Plaintiffs' reliance
damages.

Supplemental Findings & Conclusions 9 [R, p. 245]. Accordingly, because Teton County failed

to prove that Bums would have incurred a loss had it been allowed to operate the temporary
facility, there is no justification for capping Bums' reliance damages. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts§ 349 (hereinafter "Restatement§ 349"):
As an alternative to the measure of damages stated in § 34 7
[pertaining to expectation interest], the injured party has a right to
damages based on his reliance interest, including expenditures
made in preparation for performance or in performance, less any
loss that the party in breach can prove with reasonable certainty the
injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed.
(Emphasis added.)

Accord Silverwing, 164 Idaho at 797, 435 P.3d at 1117 (quoting

Restatement§ 349).

-1521813.001 \4848-6779-9465v3

(iii)

The District Court Found That Burns’ Reliance Damages Were Caused by
Teton County’s Breach.

Teton County contends that “[t]he district court failed to consider causation as part of its
calculation of damages.” Appellant’s Brief 16. But the district court not only discussed the
question of causation at pages 10-11 in its Supplemental Findings & Conclusions [R, pp. 24647], it both articulated the controlling legal principles under Idaho law and made supplemental
findings of causation.
Thus, as the district court properly concluded,
The applicable legal standard applied to reliance damages is:
A party aggrieved by a breach of contract may be
entitled to reimbursement for losses caused by its
reliance on the contract, even if the aggrieved party
elects to rescind the contract. Brown v. Yacht Club
of Coeur d’Alene, Ltd., 111 Idaho 195, 198, 722
P.2d 1062, 1065 (Ct. App. 1986).
Reliance
damages include expenses reasonably related to the
purposes of the contract which would not have been
incurred but for the contract’s existence. Id. at 198200, 722 P.2d at 1065-1067.
Beco Const. Co. v. Harper Contracting, Inc., 130 Idaho 4, 9, 936
P.2d 202, 207 (Ct. App. 1997).
Supplemental Findings & Conclusions 10 [R, p. 246.]

The Supreme Court’s opinion in

Silverwing earlier this year adopted the foregoing legal standard:
This Restatement [§ 344] provision makes it clear that
reliance damages are intended to put SilverWing in as good as a
position as it would have been in had the County not made the
alleged promises. In other words, an award of reliance damages
“returns the plaintiff to its precontractual position by putting a
dollar value on the detriment the plaintiff incurred in reliance on
the now-broken promise.”
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164 Idaho at 797, 435 P.3d at 1117 (italics added) (citation omitted).
And after articulating the controlling legal principles and relevant factual findings, the
district court expressly found as follows:


Burns Concrete incurred $1,461,393.53 in losses caused by its
reliance on the Agreement. Those reliance damages were
reasonably related to the Agreement’s purpose.
Burns
Concrete would not have incurred the expenses if not for the
Agreement’s existence.

Supplemental Findings & Conclusions 11 (emphasis in original) [R, p. 247]. There is substantial
evidence in the record supporting the district court’s findings. SOF ¶¶ 6, 13, 14, 31, 42, 55 & 56.
(iv)

The District Court Limited Burns’ Reliance Damages to a Reasonable
Duration.

Teton County also argues that Burns’ damages should be limited to the period beginning
with the date of the Agreement and ending “when it is no longer reasonable to incur additional
expenses in reliance on the promise that has been breached.” Appellant’s Brief 16. The issues
concerning the appropriate “beginning date” and “ending date” are discussed in turn.
The undisputed evidence at trial established that Burns incurred expenses for the Drigg’s
facility in reasonable reliance on the Agreement being subsequently executed. [Tr, p. 219, L. 11
– p. 221, L. 12; p. 460, LL. 8-25 & p. 229, L. 1 – p. 230, L. 6.] The cited trial testimony fully
supports the district courts following findings:
In this case, Teton County approved a zone change of the
property from commercial to light industrial on February 26, 2007.
That zone change was conditioned on Burns Holdings entering a
development agreement. Subsequent to that date, the parties began
to negotiate the terms of the Agreement. A majority of Plaintiffs’
claimed expenditures, which occurred subsequent to February 26,
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2007 and prior to August 31, 2007, were incurred in making
improvements to Highway 33 (as required under the Agreement),
grading the site, and relocating and assembling the "Johnson Ross"
plant for use as the temporary facility. Teton County foresaw both
the magnitude and type of these expenditures. This Court is not
convinced, however, that Teton County did or could have foreseen
Plaintiffs' expenditures, which arose prior to the zone change made
on February 26, 2007.
Plaintiffs' expenditures, incurred in
preparation for Plaintiffs' performance under the Agreement, shall
be permitted from February 26, 2007, onward.

Findings and Conclusions 15-16 [R, pp. 220-21].
Teton County nonetheless argues, as it did below, that reliance damages are limited to the
period commencing with the execution of a contract. Appellant's Brief 17. And although there
is admittedly authority for such a limitation, there is a clear split of authority on the question,
with the Idaho Supreme Court having decided the question to the contrary. The district court
provided the following detailed support for its determination of the law:
Plaintiffs respond that under the facts of this case, expenses
were incurred in reliance on the contract prior to the contract's
execution and should be included in the damages calculation.
Plaintiffs cite Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl.
135, 161 (2002), in support of its position that pre-contract
expenses should be permitted.
In Westfed, the United States Court of Federal Claims noted
that many jurisdictions do not permit a plaintiff to recover precontractual expenditures. It then explained:
Notwithstanding such authorities, courts have
permitted recovery of pre-contract expenses when
the defendant knew of such expenses. See, e.g.,
Coast/and Corp. v. Third Nat'/ Mortgage Co., 611
F.2d 969, 979 (4th Cir.1979). Under Restatement
(Second) of Contracts § 349 (1979), reliance
interest includes "expenditures made in preparation
for performance." See also Goodman v. Dicker, 169
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F.2d 684, 685 (D.C.Cir.1948) (permitting recovery
of “moneys which appellees expended in
preparation to do business” under a promised
franchise); Sec. Stove & Mfg. Co. v. Am. Ry.
Express Co., 227 Mo. App. 175, 51 S.W.2d 572,
577 (1932) (granting pre-contractual expenses as
reliance recovery on the ground that “[t]he whole
damage . . . was suffered in contemplation of
defendant performing its contract, which it failed to
do, and would not have been sustained except for
the reliance by plaintiff upon defendant to perform
it”).
. . . [T]he Federal Circuit has focused less on when
the contract was executed and more on whether the
damage was foreseeable:
In order to . . . [recover] . . . reliance
damages . . . plaintiff’s loss must
have been foreseeable to the party in
breach at the time of contract
formation. . . .
“Loss may be
foreseeable as a probable result of a
breach because it follows from the
breach (a) in the ordinary course of
events, or (b) as a result of special
circumstances, beyond the ordinary
course of events, that the party in
breach had reason to know.” In order
to be entitled to reliance damages, a
plaintiff must prove that both the
magnitude and type of damages were
foreseeable. . . . [To be foreseeable]
“the injury that occurs must be one
of such a kind and amount as a
prudent man would have realized to
be a probable result of his breach.”
Landmark Land Co. v. United States, 256 F.3d
1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
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... [C]ourts have recognized and applied the
Restatement concept of recovering reliance interest
that includes preparation to perform in the Winstar
context. See, e.g., Glendale, 239 F.3d at 1383 ("A
party may recover expenses of preparation of part
performance, as well as other foreseeable expenses
incurred in reliance upon the contract. . . . [T]he
injured party has a right to damages based on his
reliance interest, including expenditures made in
preparation for performance or in performance")
(internal quotations and citations omitted). See also
Glass v. United States, 47 Fed.Cl. 316, 326 (2000)
(permitting recovery of accounting and legal fees
expended in preparation for merger), vacated in
part on other grounds, 258 F.3d 1349
(Fed.Cir.2001).

Westfed Holdings, Inc. v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 135, [161-62]
(2002).
The Idaho Supreme Court has also taken the approach that
reliance damages may include expenses incurred before the parties
reach an agreement. In French v. Nabob Silver-Lead Co., 82 Idaho
120, 350 P.2d 206 (1960), the plaintiff negotiated a lease extension
with defendants. As part of negotiations, defendants notified
plaintiff that it would be unable to supply compressed air to him as
it had in the past. Throughout contract negotiations, plaintiff
consulted with defendants regarding his efforts to construct an
airline and how the timing of that completion might affect the
lease. Plaintiff constructed the airline before the lease agreement
was executed. After defendants breached the contract, plaintiff
sought damages based on his costs in constructing the airline. The
trial court denied plaintiff damages. On appeal, the Idaho Supreme
Court reversed, explaining: "The airline was built in anticipation of
a new lease in accordance with the suggestion of respondent's
officers. Expenses incurred by a party in anticipation of or
preparation for performance of a contract may be recovered as
damages in an action for a breach thereof." French v. Nabob
Silver-Lead Co., 82 Idaho 120, 128, 350 P.2d 206, 210 (1960).

Findings & Conclusions 14-15 (emphasis added) [R, pp. 219-20].
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Teton County presents no persuasive reason why the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in

French is not controlling under the rule of stare decisis articulated in Doe, 160 Idaho at 859, 380
P.3d at 180.

1

Teton County next argues that Bums' reliance damages should be limited to the period
ending four years after Teton County approved the rezone on February 26, 2007, because "by
February 26, 2011, Teton County was authorized by statute to rezone the Property." Appellant's
Brief 18 (citation to record omitted). This argument is meritless for the elemental reason that
Teton County has never had the right to rezone Bums' property because Bums has not breached
the Agreement, as held in Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County, 161 Idaho 117, 384 P.3d 354
(2016) ("Burns Concrete I").
1

Cf

Further, Teton County contends to this very day that the

DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES

§ 12.3(1) (2d ed. 1993):

Recoupment through performance: pre-contract expenses
and fixed overhead. Given an enforceable set of promises, perhaps
the most important reason for allowing recovery for some kinds of
reliance expense is that they represent a kind of partial expectancy;
they would have been recouped by the gain the plaintiff would
have made if the defendant had performed. If this is correct, it
would be perfectly sound to award the plaintiff any reasonably
proven "partial expectancy." On this basis one might justify an
award of pre-contract expenditures, even though they could not
possibly be said to have been made in reliance on a non-existent
promise. If such expenditures were directed toward a hoped-for
contract, the contract was in fact made and breached, and the
expenditures would have been recouped had it been performed, it
is difficult to see any objection to recovery. Whether it is called
"reliance expense or partial expectancy does not seem to matter
very much when enforceable, bargained-for promises were
exchanged.
Id. at 53-54 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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Agreement should not be rescinded and that Teton County did not even breach the Agreement.
And under such circumstances, Burns had no reasonable alternative but to incur those costs
necessary to maintain its temporary facility in place, such as paying the property taxes and
utilities, through trial.
Finally, Teton County agues that the district court’s award of the demolition costs Burns
will incur is error.

But as previously stated, the district court found that the estimated

demobilization costs were reasonable and this finding is supported by substantial and
uncontested evidence in the record. See supra Statement of the Case at part C(iv) (Support for
Demobilization Costs).
(v)

The District Court Did Not Overstate Burns’ Reliance Damages.

Teton County fails to cite any legal authority at all or make any new arguments with
respect to the district court’s factual findings not previously discussed by it in support of Teton
County’s fifth and final stated grounds for the contention that the district court erred in its award
of reliance damages to Burns. See Appellant’s Brief 18-20. In a nutshell, however, the gist of
Teton County’s argument is that the district court erred when it found:
If the Agreement had been fully performed, Plaintiffs would have
paid off its expenses (including those encompassed by the reliance
damages) and debt and produced a net profit by 2017. Teton
County did not establish that Plaintiffs would have suffered a net
loss even if it had been allowed to continue in operation. Teton
County failed to prove losses sufficient to offset Plaintiffs’ reliance
damages.
Supplemental Findings & Conclusions 9 [R, p. 245]. But because the district court’s foregoing
findings are supported by the substantial evidence in the record discussed, quoted, and cited in
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the above Statement of the Case at part C(v) (Loss Caused by Breach of Agreement), these
findings are not subject to overturn on appeal. Huber, 159 Idaho at 841, 367 P.3d at 236.
B.

The District Court Did Not Err In Its Award Of Either Summary Judgment Or
Final Judgment To Burns.
Burns’ motion for summary judgment was briefed by the parties and then heard by the

district court on April 10, 2017, during which hearing the court announced its decision and stated
its reasons from the bench and following which the court entered its May 2, 2017, order in the
form submitted by counsel for Teton County. [R, pp. 67-68.] As expressly stated in the order,
both Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings were granted summary judgment on the liability issue
only of their claim for breach of contract, together with rescission of the Agreement. Upon
Teton County’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, however, the district court issued its
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion to Reconsider and Motion in Limine, filed
February 12, 2018 (“Pretrial Decision”) [R, pp. 75-99], in which the district court, inter alia,
limited its grant for breach of contract and the right to seek reliance damages to Burns Holdings
only. Pretrial Decision 14 & 19 [R, 88 & 93]. The facts supporting the grant of summary
judgment to Burns Holdings on the liability issue are set forth in Cross-Appellants’ Brief at SOF
¶¶ 9-20, and the district court’s rulings granting Burns Holdings summary judgment on the
liability issue are set forth in SOF ¶¶ 21-22.
Based on the foregoing rulings, the issue of Teton County’s liability to Burns Concrete
for breach of contract and reliance damages was unresolved and therefore tried to the district
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court. And as also quoted in the above Statement of the Case at part C(ii) (Assignment of
Claims), the district court ruled as follows on this issue:
[S]ince 2013, both Burns Holdings and Burns Concrete have an
equal interest in the real property. Both Plaintiffs have assigned to
each other an undivided interest [in] their respective claims in this
action.
Findings & Conclusions 10 [R, p. 215]. The district court’s foregoing ruling is supported by
substantial and uncontested evidence in the record. SOF ¶¶ 51-53, Exhibit 4 [Ex, pp. 104-106],
and Exhibit 5 [Ex, pp. 438-40].
Moreover, although Teton County asserts three arguments under the heading “The district
court erred in granting summary judgment on liability for breach of the Agreement,” all of these
arguments relate to the district court’s findings and conclusions made after trial. Each of Teton
County’s three arguments are rebutted in turn below.
(i)

Teton County’s Breach of the Agreement Caused Burns’ Injuries.

The gist of Teton County’s first argument is that “[a]t trial, the Burns Companies did not
establish, and the trial court did not find, a causal link between the 2012 demand letter [from
Teton County] and any claimed injury.” Appellant’s Brief 24.
This argument is refuted by the district court’s findings quoted and the substantial
evidence in the record cited in the above Statement of the Case at part C(i) (Cessation of Plant
Operations) and part C(v) (Loss Caused by Breach of Agreement).
(ii)

Teton County Breached the Agreement.

Teton County next argues that it did not breach the Agreement for three stated reasons.
Appellant’s Brief 25-28.
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This argument, however, is refuted with respect to the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to Burns Holdings by the facts set forth in SOF ¶¶ 9-20 and the court’s rulings in SOF
¶¶ 21-22, as explained above. And the argument is further refuted with respect to both Burns
Concrete and Burns Holdings by the district court’s findings quoted and the substantial and
uncontested evidence in the record cited in the above Statement of the Case at C(i) (Cessation of
Plant Operations).
Additionally, Teton County’s contention that “[t]he temporary batch plant violates Teton
County’s height restriction[,]” Appellant’s Brief 27, is meritless for a host of reasons. First,
because this defense to Burns’ claims could have been raised in Burns Concrete I, consideration
of the contention is proscribed by the “law of the case” doctrine. PHH Mortg., 164 Idaho at 38,
423 P.3d at 459 (The “‘doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged
errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal.’” (citation omitted)).
Second, this defense was neither raised in Teton County’s Answer and Counterclaim [R, pp.
44-59] nor raised and supported by any evidence presented at trial. State of Idaho v. Victor
Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017) (“We have long held that
‘[a]ppellate court review is limited to the evidence, theories and arguments that were presented
below.’” (citations omitted)).

Third, there is no evidence in the record establishing that

machinery or equipment not permanently located on real property must comply with height
limitations on the construction of improvements to real property imposed under the zoning
ordinances adopted by Teton County or the City of Driggs. Id. Fourth, the district court’s
decision prior to the first appeal cited by Teton County relating to – but not deciding – whether
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machinery or equipment not permanently located on real property must comply with the zoning
ordinances adopted by Teton County or the City of Driggs was vacated by the opinion in Burns
Concrete I, with the specific question never having been presented to or decided by the district

court.

Id.

Thus, for all four of the foregoing reasons Teton County's contention that the

temporary facility violates some unspecified height restriction is not now subject to appellate
review.
(iii)

Burns Concrete Is a Party to the Agreement.

Teton County's third and final argument is that Bums Concrete is not a party to the
Agreement. Appellant's Brief 28-29.
This defense to Bums Concrete's claims could also have been raised in Burns Concrete I.
Accordingly, consideration of this contention is also proscribed by the "law of the case" doctrine.
PHH Mortg., 164 Idaho at 38,423 P.3d at 459.

Moreover, the merits of this argument are refuted by the district court's ruling quoted and
substantial and uncontested evidence in the record cited in the above Statement of the Case at
part C(ii) (Assignment of Claims).

2

2

The district court's ruling is supported by its following findings and conclusions:
A. Teton County is liable to both Plaintiffs for its breach of the
Agreement.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that covenants running
with the land "may be enforced by one other than a party to them
where the original parties intended that the restrictions should
benefit the land of the person claiming the right of enforcement."
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The law in Idaho with respect to the assignment of legal claims is set forth as follows in

St. Luke's Magic Valley Regional Medical Center v. Luciani, 154 Idaho 37, 293 P.3d 661 (2013):
It is settled in Idaho that "choses in action are generally
assignable." Purco Fleet Servs., Inc. v. Idaho State Dep 't of Fin.,

Sun Valley Ctr. for Arts & Humanities, Inc. v. Sun Valley Co., 107
Idaho 411, 413, 690 P.2d 346, 348 (1984).
Land use covenants may run with the land, and the
primary characteristic of a covenant running with
the land is that both liability upon it and
enforceability of it pass with the transfer of the
estate. Thus, a covenant that runs with the land may
be enforced against the party who bears the burden
of the covenant by the party who receives the
benefit of the burden, the buyer, or the current
owner of the land. In fact, all grantors, back to and
including the original grantor-covenantor, become
liable upon the breach thereof to the assignee or
grantee in possession or entitled to the possession at
the time.
20 Am. Jur. 2d Covenants, Etc.§ 119.
Paragraph 12.b. of the Agreement indicates that it "shall
run with the land and bind the property in perpetuity, and shall
inure to the benefit of and be enforceable by the parties, and any of
their respective legal representatives, heirs, successors, and
assigns." (Emphasis added.) Bums Concrete owned the property
designated in Exhibit A to the Agreement. The Agreement clearly
indicates that its terms applied to both Bums Holdings, as
signatory to the Agreement, and to Bums Concrete, as owner of
the property.
Furthermore, since 2013, both Bums Holdings and Bums
Concrete have an equal interest in the real property. Both Plaintiffs
have assigned to each other an undivided interest [in] their
respective claims in this action.

Findings & Conclusions 10 (underscoring added) [R, p. 215].
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140 Idaho 121, 126, 90 P.3d 346, 351 (2004). “An assignment of
the chose in action transfers to the assignee and divests the
assignor of all control and right to the cause of action, and the
assignee becomes the real party in interest.” Id. Thereafter,
“[o]nly the assignee may prosecute an action on the chose in
action.” Id.
St Luke’s, 154 Idaho at 41, 293 P.3d at 665.
Teton County challenges the district court’s referenced ruling on the grounds that the
cross-assignments made by Burns Concrete and Burns Holdings pursuant to Exhibit 5 [Ex, pp.
438-40] were ineffective because neither of these plaintiffs assigned all of its respective claim
against Teton County to the other.

But Teton County cites no authority holding that the

assignment of a particular undivided interest in a claim is ineffectual if the assignor retains a
separate and distinct undivided interest. Furthermore, Teton County’s challenge ignores Idaho’s
law of common interests established by Idaho Code § 55-104 (“Every interest created in favor of
several persons in their own right is an interest in common . . .”). And as held in Ogilvie v. Idaho
Bank & Trust Co., 99 Idaho 361, 366, 582 P.2d 215, 220 (1978), “Idaho continues to recognize
joint tenancies between two persons as a valid and enforceable means of concurrent ownership of
property, whether real, personal, tangible or intangible. I.C. § 55-104.” See also id. at 366-67,
582 P.2d at 220-21 (“Richard Ogilvie and respondent Ogilvie acquired equal one-half interests in
the stock certificates as tenants in common and IB&T could foreclose on Richard Ogilvie’s onehalf interest.”).
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Accordingly, the district court did not err when it concluded:

"Both Plaintiffs have

assigned to each other an undivided interest [in] their respective claims in this action." Findings
& Conclusions 10 [R, p. 215].

C.

The District Court Did Not Err By Granting Judgment In Accordance With Burns
Concrete I.

Teton County's final contention is that the district court erred in including the following
provision in the judgment being appealed:
2. The running of the 18-month period provided in Paragraph
2.b(iv) of the Developer's Agreement for Bums Holdings, LLC,
recorded September 5, 2007 by the Teton County Recorder as
Instrument No. 191250, pertaining to the construction of the
Permanent Facility defined and described in such agreement is
tolled in accordance with the Supreme Court of Idaho's opinion in
Burns Concrete, Inc. v. Teton County~ 161 Idaho 117, 384 P.3d
364 (2016.)
[R, p. 260-61.]

Teton County's challenge to incorporation of the foregoing provision in the judgment is
again proscribed by the "law of the case" doctrine:
Idaho adheres to the "law of the case" doctrine, which provides
that when "the Supreme Court, in deciding a case presented states
in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision,
such pronouncement becomes the law of the case and must be
adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial
court and upon subsequent appeal.
PHH Mortg., 164 Idaho at 38,438 P.3d at 459 (emphasis added).

Furthermore, although Teton County now asserts that "the requested declaration was
moot and not ripe[, because] Teton County had withdrawn its breach of contract claim against
the Bums Companies," Appellant's Brief 31, there is nothing in the record supporting this
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assertion. And with respect to the assertion that “[t]he Parties did not try the declaratory
judgment claim at trial,” id., Burns responds that (i) Burns proved at trial Teton County breached
the Agreement, as established by the district court’s ruling quoted and substantial and
uncontested evidence in the record cited in the above Statement of the Case at part C(i)
(Cessation of Plant Operations), and (ii) key factual matters supporting declaratory relief are
supported by Burns’ and Teton County’s respective verified pleadings on file, as established by
SOF ¶¶ 13, 14, and 16. It was therefore not error for the district court to incorporate into its
judgment the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in Burns Concrete I.
Finally, any conceivable concern that “inclusion of the declaration in the judgment
presents the possibility of confusion and double recovery[,]” Appellant’s Brief 31, can be
completely eliminated with the rescission of the Agreement – which Burns’ has steadfastly
sought over the entire course of this very long case and Teton County has steadfastly opposed.
D.

Burns Is Entitled To Its Reasonable Attorney Fees Incurred On Appeal.
The district court held that Burns prevailed in this civil action. Order Granting Motion to

Augment, filed in this appeal on October 9, 2019, Ex. 5 at pp. 224-26. In this regard, Paragraph
12.e of the Agreement provides: “If any party shall bring suit against the other party to enforce
this agreement, the prevailing party shall be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.”
Exhibit 3 at 6 [Ex, p. 205]. Accordingly, Burns should be awarded the attorney fees incurred in
defending against this appeal in accordance with I.A.R. 41 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(1) (“In any civil
action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, including paralegal fees, to the prevailing
party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), when provided for by any statute or contract.”).
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Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 751, 215 P.3d 457, 471
(2009) (awarding attorney fees on appeal pursuant to contractual provisions and I.R.C.P.
54(e)(1 )).

V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, Bums respectfully requests this Court to deny all relief
sought by Teton County in this appeal, together with awarding Bums its reasonable attorney fees
and costs incurred on appeal.
DATED this 24th day of October 2019.
PARSONS BERLE & LATIMER

By

Isl Robert B. Burns
Robert B. Bums
Attorneys for P laintiffs-CounterdefendantsRespondents-Cross-Appellants
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VI.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 24th day of October 2019, I caused the foregoing

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF to be served by the method indicated below and addressed to the
following:

□
□
□
□

Billie J. Siddoway
Lindsey A. Blake
Teton County Prosecuting Attorney
230 N. Main Street, Room 125
Driggs, Idaho 83422-5124
Facsimile (208) 354-2994

~

By

Isl Robert B. Burns
Robert B. Bums
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U.S. Mail
Hand Delivered
Facsimile
Email
iCourt E-File Delivery

Lone Peak Valuation Group
Burns Concrete v Tet on County

.~rejected Available Cash for Equity Holders From Drig~~'!!!!1~ojected Revenue Using Building Permits') _ _ __

...,.
<l>

Projected Revenue

Cost of Goods Sold
Materials
Fuel
Repairs
Equipment Rent
labor
Other
Total Cost of Goods Sold
Operating Expenses
Liability Insurance
Bad Debts
Officer Payroll
Payroll
Payroll Taxes and Insurance
Pension Contributions
Total Operating bpenses

Assumed
Exeense level

Schttlult J
Schtdult J
Schtdult J

Schtdult l
Schtdult l

Schtduk J
Sch«Jult 7.1

Schtdult l
Schtdult J
Schttluk 1

Sditdult J

34.07%
6.31%
2.90%
0.52%
18.46%
1.59%

1.44%
0.28%
2.99%
3.79%
0.68%
0.35%

2010
158,869

s

s

54,120
10,030
4,609
832
29,322
2,523
101,437

s

2011
96,528

$

32,883
6,094
2,801
505
17,816
1,533
61,633

f

~ l > Less: Inte rest Expense on Debt
2, less: Debi Principle Repayment
Less: Permanent Facility Capital Expenditures

t

~

$

43,159
7,999
3,676
663
23,384
2,012
80,893

s

2013
197,078

$

67,136
12,443
5,718
1,032
36,375
3,130
125,833

$

2014
197,078

s

67,136
12,443
5,718
1,032
36,375
3,130
125,833

s

2015
293,606

s

2016
331,815

$

113,035
20,949
9,627
1,737
61,243
S 270
211.862

100,019
18,537
8,518
1,537
54,191
4,664

$

187,466

s

2017
434,376

$

147,973
27,425
12,603
2,274
80,173
6,899
277,347

S

Total
1,836,042

s

625,460
115,920
53,270
9,614
338,878
29,163
1,172,305

63,85"

63.BS"

63.85"

63.85"

63,85"

63.BS"

63.BS"

6J.BS"

2,293
440
4,756
6,026
1,084
551
15,151

1,393
268
2,890
3.662
659
335
9,206

1,828
351
3,793
4,806
865
440
12,083

2,844
546
5,900
7,476
1,345
684
18,795

2,844
546
5,900
7,476
1,345
684
18,795

4,237
814
8,790
11,137
2,004
1,019
28,001

4,789
920
9,934
12,587
2,265
1,151
31,645

6,269
1,204
13,005
16,477
2,965
1,507
41,427

26,498
5,090
54,969
69,646
12,533
6,369
175,105

s

42,280

$

s

25,689

s

9,54"

9.54"

s

33,717

s

9.54"

$

52,449

s

9.54"

s

52,449

s

s

s

9.54"

9.54"

9.54"

78,138

s

88,307

26.61"

26.61"

25.61"

25.61"

26.61"

25.61"

25.61"

109,852
165,559

106,218
194,230

91,571
208,878

75,819
224,630

58,878
241,570

40,661
259,788

21,069
279,380

s

115,602
]6. 61"

C

(274,759) $

(266,731) $

Cumulative Cash Available for Equity Holders

$

(233,131) $

(507,890) $

(774,622) $ (1,022,622) $ (1,270,621) $ (1,492,932) $ (1,705,073) $ (1,589,471)

$ (3,425,844) $ (3,572,123) $

(534,843) $ (1,146,323) $

(248,000) $

(528,156) $

(222,310) $

181,221

$

(212,142)

24,950

(.£_

c~

115,602

9.54"

488.632.42 )
25.61!%

)

(233,131) $

(248,000) $

s

)

504,068
1,574,036

$ (1,589,471)

n/a

$ (3,658,974) $ (4,080,014) $ (1,309,465) $ (2,168,944) $ (1,798,777) . $ (1,311,711) $ (1,680,124) $ (1,589,471)

~
<l> ~.s.ed on Information prO'lktt'd by James Wa/terS,, I undl!ntand that bul~lng pcrmlb ate• good proxy for revenul! .atloutlon'.

<2> lntcrut e11pe n,c al'ld Pfln<lp.al repayment .amount fOf" 2010 is for 11 months uku~ted from lhw ,1nnu.al amoun1s on -Xr,ec.tule S
<l> 2010 Is cakubte-d for 11 months. See SchcduW 6

n

.N

Sdltd11k 5

2012
126,693

$

Cumulative Cash Available for Equity Holders plus
Working Capital (Burns Idaho Falls fadllty)

00

Sditdult 5

s

Less: Taxes
Cash Available for Equity Holders

<3> Working Capital (Burns Idaho Falls Facility)

I

$

Expected Net Incremental Profits

g)

6J.BS"

9,54"

'f

hed~le

Feb-Dec

Sch«Jule3.J

Sc:htdult 1
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